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Abstract.  1 
Wildfires pose a serious threat to life in many countries. For police, fire and emergency 2 
services authorities in most jurisdictions in North America and Australia evacuation is now 3 
the option that is preferred overwhelmingly. Wildfire evacuation modeling can assist 4 
authorities in planning evacuation responses to future threats. Understanding residents’ 5 
behavior under wildfire threat may assist in wildfire evacuation modeling. A literature review 6 
was conducted to explore North American and Australian research into wildfire evacuation 7 
behavior published between January 2005 and June 2017. Wildfire evacuation policies differ 8 
across the two regions: in North America mandatory evacuations are favored, in Australia 9 
most are advisory. Research from both regions indicates that following a wildfire evacuation 10 
warning some threatened residents will wish to remain on their property in order to protect it, 11 
many will delay evacuating, and some residents who are not on their property when an 12 
evacuation warning is issued may seek to return. Mandatory evacuation is likely to result in 13 
greater compliance, enforcement policies are also likely to be influential. Self-delayed 14 
evacuation is likely if warnings are not sufficiently informative: residents are likely to engage 15 
in information search rather than initiating evacuation actions. The wildfire warning and 16 
threat histories of a location may influence residents’ decisions and actions. The complexities 17 
of behavioral factors influencing residents’ actions following an evacuation warning pose 18 
challenges for wildfire evacuation modeling. Suggestions are offered for ways in which 19 
authorities might reduce the numbers of residents who delay evacuating following a wildfire 20 
warning. 21 
Keywords: Wildfire, Bushfire, Evacuation, Delay, Human behavior, Modeling 22 
  23 
Behavioral factors in evacuation under wildfire threat                                                            3 
 1 
 2 
“Should We Leave Now?”: Behavioral Factors in 3 
Evacuation Under Wildfire Threat 4 
 5 
1. Introduction 6 
1.1 Background 7 
Wildfires pose a serious threat to individual households and entire communities in numerous 8 
countries. Despite advances in fire suppression and communications technologies, significant 9 
numbers of civilian wildfire deaths and injuries occur annually [1 - 4]. There is general 10 
agreement among wildfire researchers that destructive wildfire events will probably occur 11 
more frequently in the immediate future, for three reasons. First, increasing numbers of 12 
householders are choosing to reside in areas of high wildfire risk, particularly in wildland-13 
urban interface (WUI) locations—areas where people and their properties meet, or intermix 14 
with, significant wildland vegetation fuels [5]. Second, climate change is resulting in reduced 15 
rainfall and higher average temperatures in many locations [6]. Third, policies of some land 16 
management agencies and local governments constrain fire suppression regimes and 17 
vegetation management programs [7 - 8]. 18 
 The direct threat to life posed by wildfires results mostly from the high levels of 19 
thermal energies generated by the combustion of large masses of vegetation [9]. Many 20 
civilian wildfire deaths and injuries have resulted from exposure to radiant and/or convective 21 
heat. Automobile crashes during late evacuation attempts have also caused fatalities [2, 4, 9 - 22 
12]. Residents facing imminent threat from wildfires have, in principle, three options for 23 
protecting themselves: contesting the threat by actively defending the property, enduring the 24 
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threat by sheltering in place, or avoiding the threat by evacuating (either as part of an 1 
organized evacuation endeavor or by self-evacuating). However, as discussed in Sections 3 2 
and 4 of the paper, how community members respond to wildfire threat may be complex and 3 
involve many factors. For example, residents who intend, and prepare, to defend their 4 
property may shelter for a period of time while the main fire front impacts the property before 5 
resuming active defense. 6 
For police, fire and emergency services authorities in most jurisdictions in North 7 
America and Australia evacuation is now the option that is preferred overwhelmingly [13, 8 
14]. Late evacuations by residents under imminent wildfire threat are likely to result in deaths 9 
or injuries [2, 4, 11] and may impede suppression endeavors by fire agencies [15, 16]. 10 
Evacuation modeling can improve public safety by helping authorities to plan for evacuations 11 
from neighborhoods in the event of future wildfire threats [17]. The usefulness of wildfire 12 
evacuation models can be improved by incorporating representations of residents’ behaviors 13 
following a wildfire evacuation warning [18,19]. 14 
1.2 Aims 15 
This special issue of Fire Technology is concerned primarily with fire evacuation modeling. 16 
In this paper we review published accounts of research about evacuation and late evacuation 17 
behavior by residents facing a wildfire threat. Our aim is threefold: first to summarize what 18 
researchers have found about residents’ behavior when under wildfire threat; second, to 19 
inform those engaged in wildfire evacuation modeling about current knowledge concerning 20 
the actions of residents who experience wildfire threat; third, to present findings which might 21 
assist agencies to reduce the numbers of at-risk residents likely to not evacuate or delay 22 
evacuating when threatened by a serious wildfire.  23 
1.3 Method 24 
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Our method was similar to those used for recent reviews of social science research about 1 
community wildfire safety [20, 21]. Searches for reports of empirical research about wildfire 2 
evacuation behavior were made using ScienceDirect, Scopus, Web of Science, PsychINFO, 3 
Google Scholar and Google Chrome using the search terms evacuation AND wildfire, 4 
bushfire, forest fire. The searches covered refereed journal papers, conference proceedings, 5 
books and book chapters, and technical reports, written in English, published between 6 
January 2005 and June 2017; 157 publications were located. Titles and abstracts were read 7 
initially and works which appeared to be relevant were examined further. Publications were 8 
included in the review if they reported empirical information about residents’ behavior or 9 
intentions in relation to wildfire threat warnings. Papers were excluded from further 10 
consideration if they (a) reported simulation or modeling research, (b) discussed only 11 
community wildfire safety policies or residents’ preferences, or (c) simply referred to 12 
previously published papers about wildfire evacuation. A total of 27 papers were located 13 
which satisfied the criteria: 19 reported Australian research, 6 reported research conducted in 14 
the United States, and 2 reported Canadian research. No reports in English about wildfire 15 
evacuation research in other countries were located. 16 
1.4 Overview 17 
The paper begins with brief summaries of authorities’ community wildfire safety response 18 
policies in North America--Canada and the United States--(Section 2.1) and Australia 19 
(Section 2.2). These indicate a difference between the approaches taken by authorities in the 20 
two regions. In North America evacuation is usually mandated, in Australia evacuation is 21 
usually advisory—forced evacuations are rare. Because of this difference we chose to group 22 
research findings in Section 3 according to country: the United States (3.1), Canada (3.2) and 23 
Australia (3.3); we then summarize findings about residents’ decisions and actions in 24 
response to wildfire threats, including evacuation and delayed evacuation. In Section 4 issues 25 
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associated with the effectiveness of wildfire threat warnings are discussed. In Section 5 we 1 
offer some tentative conclusions about behavioral factors related to residents not evacuating 2 
or delaying evacuation—these factors are likely to militate against the predictability of 3 
threatened residents’ decisions and protective actions, thus presenting challenges to the 4 
development of wildfire evacuation models. Finally, we propose some potential implications 5 
of the research findings for agencies responsible for wildfire evacuations. 6 
2. Community wildfire safety policies in North America and 7 
Australia 8 
2.1 North America 9 
2.1.1 United States 10 
In the United States, since the end of the Second World War, the policy of authorities has 11 
been that evacuation, usually mandatory, of residents in the face of wildfire threat is the 12 
safest option [13, 22, 23]. A recent Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) public 13 
advice document makes clear that timely evacuation continues to be the recommended action 14 
for US residents threatened by a wildfire: 15 
“When a wildfire threatens your area, the best action to protect yourself and your 16 
family is to evacuate early to avoid being trapped….Your goal now, before a fire 17 
happens, is to make your home or business and the surrounding area more resistant to 18 
catching fire and burning. This means reducing the amount of material that can burn 19 
easily in and around your home or business by clearing away debris and other 20 
flammable materials, and using fire-resistant materials for landscaping and 21 
construction…If the danger is imminent, local authorities may issue an evacuation 22 
notice to alert residents that a fire is nearby and it is important to leave the area. 23 
Evacuation orders vary by state and community and may range from voluntary to 24 
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mandatory. When authorities issue a mandatory evacuation notice, leave the area 1 
immediately”.  [24, pp. 3-4] 2 
Following the southern California Cedar Fire in 2003 authorities’ emphasis on evacuation 3 
was questioned when the majority of the civilian fatalities apparently occurred while 4 
attempting to evacuate in vehicles [25, 26]. Ensuing discussion about alternatives to mass 5 
evacuations of residents [23, 27] made reference to the community wildfire (‘bushfire’ in 6 
Australia) safety position advocated at that time by the Australasian Fire Authorities Council 7 
which stated that staying and defending a suitably prepared home should be considered as a 8 
safe alternative (see 2.2). Despite this, evacuations—usually mandatory—continue to be the 9 
public safety response to wildfire threats implemented by authorities in the US under most 10 
circumstances. 11 
2.1.2 Canada 12 
All fire management agencies in Canada recommend evacuation when public safety is 13 
threatened by a wildfire [16]. While mandatory evacuation orders can be issued and enforced, 14 
certain designated locations are exempt from mandatory evacuations. For most communities, 15 
provincial and territorial fire management agencies work with civil authorities to effect 16 
evacuations when there is a serious wildfire threat. Typically, a wildfire Incident Commander 17 
requests an evacuation order by the local government authority or Provincial Fire 18 
Commissioner. Following which: 19 
“Evacuation orders are enforced by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other 20 
police service, while the Provincial Emergency Management Program works with the 21 
local government authority to coordinate reception centres and support services for 22 
evacuees. Provincial agencies do not have the authority to order people to evacuate 23 
Indian reserves, Department of National Defence Reserves, or other federal lands. The 24 
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default practice is for the provincial agency representative to advise people living on 1 
such lands that it would be prudent to leave, and the RCMP or other police services 2 
help to promote this safety message. This practice may be interpreted by those 3 
affected as an evacuation order, even though there is no legislative requirement to 4 
leave”. [28, p. 11] 5 
2.2 Australia 6 
Over five decades following the end of the Second World War there was no nationally agreed 7 
approach to community bushfire safety. In 2005 the Australasian Fire Authorities Council 8 
published an official position that: “By extinguishing small initial ignitions, people of 9 
adequate mental, emotional and physical fitness, equipped with appropriate skills and basic 10 
resources can save a building that would otherwise be lost to fire” [29, p. 6]. This 2005 11 
position, that residents should be encouraged to stay on their property in order to protect their 12 
suitably prepared homes against wildfire attack and thus remain safe, was adopted by 13 
Australian fire agencies, and summarized as the ‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ 14 
policy. The policy resulted from investigations by authorities following disastrous multi-15 
fatality bushfires in Australia in 1967 and 1983 which found that residents under imminent 16 
bushfire threat were most likely to die as a result of either radiant heat exposure or vehicle 17 
accident while fleeing at the last moment and that suitably prepared homes could be 18 
successfully defended thus obviating the necessity for hazardous last-minute evacuation [30, 19 
31]. 20 
 Australia’s ‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ policy came under intense critical 21 
scrutiny during hearings conducted by the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 22 
following the country’s worst bushfire event to date. Disastrous wildfires impacted parts of 23 
the State of Victoria on 7 February 2009 killing 172 civilians and destroying more than 2000 24 
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homes [32]. It was found subsequently that 111 deceased individuals perished in houses or 1 
nearby structures such as sheds or garages [33]. Following the Royal Commission hearings 2 
the Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council (AFAC) reviewed and 3 
revised its position on community bushfire safety to state that early self-evacuation before the 4 
threat is imminent is the safest option for residents. In 2012 the AFAC position was revised 5 
further to give greater emphasis to evacuation as the preferred option in the event of bushfire 6 
threat: 7 
4.2.8 The safest action to protect life is for people to be away from the bushfire or 8 
threat of bushfire as early as possible. Leaving a high risk bushfire location is the 9 
safest action, and leaving before a bushfire threatens is always safer than remaining 10 
until a bushfire starts. Leaving becomes increasingly appropriate with higher Fire 11 
Danger Ratings… where circumstances such as weather conditions, topography or 12 
fuel loads may create intense fire behavior, leaving early may be the only safe action, 13 
even for people who are prepared to defend well-prepared buildings. (emphases in 14 
the original [14, pp. 5-6]) 15 
All Australian fire agencies modified their approaches to community bushfire safety 16 
promotion, education and response to align with the changed emphasis in the AFAC position 17 
statement. Across Australian states and territories there is not a policy of forced evacuation 18 
and fire agencies have opposed the introduction of such a policy, chiefly on the grounds that 19 
this would compromise property owners’ rights and responsibilities to make decisions about 20 
their own financial assets. In some states there is the legal option of forced evacuations 21 
following the declaration of a state of emergency by the government, but such declarations 22 
are extremely rare and there have been only a few isolated instances of police officers forcing 23 
a resident to leave [34]. Currently, no Australian fire agency recommends planning to shelter 24 
in place. However, agencies recognize that evacuation is not always possible and recommend 25 
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at-risk residents have a contingency plan for taking last-resort survival shelter. Agencies also 1 
provide advice to residents about constructing wildfire shelters, or ‘bunkers’ on their 2 
property. 3 
2.3 Discussion 4 
There are no indications that North American nor Australian authorities are considering any 5 
change from their overwhelming preference for residents to evacuate promptly in the event of 6 
a serious wildfire threat, despite some suggestions that both sheltering in place and active 7 
property defense should be considered as potential alternatives to evacuation [35]. There is 8 
also increasing interest in developing wildfire evacuation models which incorporate advances 9 
in communication technology, availability of big data and widespread use of social media [36 10 
- 38]. Evacuation of residents is thus likely to remain the mainstay of authorities’ community 11 
protection responses when serious wildfires threaten the public in North America and 12 
Australasia. However, other wildfire-prone regions around the world may differ in their 13 
community safety policies and response practices.  14 
3.  How residents respond to a wildfire threat 15 
As indicated in Section 2, there has been a reasonable amount of discussion about the merits 16 
of residents evacuating under imminent wildfire threat versus sheltering in place or engaging 17 
in active property defense [35]. However, three previous reviews have suggested that the 18 
number of studies reporting research about residents’ behavior under wildfire threat is 19 
relatively modest [15, 20, 21].  20 
3.1. United States research 21 
In an early published study of US residents’ responses to evacuation warnings, Taylor et al. 22 
[39] interviewed residents and fire agency personnel and conducted eight focus groups with 23 
residents following two Californian wildfires in 2003. There were five major findings. 24 
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Official information broadcasts were too infrequent and lacking in timely information. 1 
Residents under imminent threat reported that their search for information was urgent and 2 
emotionally-driven because of the high stakes involved; they sought real-time information 3 
and were less concerned with the source of the information (official or unofficial) than with 4 
its timeliness and apparent location relevance. Loss of electrical power supply limited 5 
residents’ access to broadcast information. Once residents had commenced evacuation, it 6 
became more difficult for them to receive information that was up-to-date and accurate at the 7 
local level. Finally, a brief step-by-step evacuation planning guide brochure prepared for 8 
residents (Get Ready, Get Set, Go) by the local Fire Safe Council was reported by many of 9 
those interviewed to have been very helpful in assisting timely evacuation. 10 
Cohn, Carroll and Kumagai [15] reported findings from 183 interviews with residents and 11 
public safety officials about evacuation warnings following wildfires in Montana (in 2000), 12 
Colorado (in 2002) and Arizona (in 2002). The researchers concluded that five stages of the 13 
overall evacuation process could be observed in all three locations: Anticipation, Warning, 14 
Displacement, Notification, and Return and Recovery. Each had distinctive features 15 
involving situational constraints and associated problems. The first two stages, Anticipation 16 
and Warning, are relevant to the present discussion. In the Anticipation stage, while agencies 17 
anticipated a potentially catastrophic fire event because of a long drought, few residents 18 
contemplated a possible fire threat. For most, anticipation of a possible need to take action 19 
only occurred when they saw smoke or heard about a fire through commercial news media. 20 
Once they were aware of a fire outbreak, their challenge was to judge the severity of the 21 
threat and prepare to take appropriate action while going about their everyday lives. For both 22 
agencies and residents, the major constraint was lack of knowledge about the likely path and 23 
rate of advance of the fire. In the Warning stage the primary problem for residents was how 24 
to interpret the information, including rumors, they were receiving from a range of sources—25 
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radio, television, family and neighbors. While some reacted speedily, others delayed because 1 
they did not perceive a need for urgency. For authorities, the major situational constraint was 2 
timing of when to impose the evacuation order. When considering imposing an evacuation 3 
order public safety officials needed to balance allowing residents time to prepare to leave 4 
with the dangers of delaying evacuation. Delaying the evacuation could mean that some 5 
evacuation routes would become unavailable, that traffic jams may result, and that evacuees 6 
would impede access by firefighting personnel. A concern for law enforcement personnel 7 
was how to manage residents who refused to leave--mostly because they wanted to defend 8 
their properties or protect them from looters. What law enforcement officers saw as 9 
discharging their responsibilities to protect members of the public, some residents saw as 10 
infringing their rights as US citizens. 11 
 McCaffrey and Winter [40] reported findings from a mail survey of residents of 12 
wildfire-prone locations in California (in 2009), Florida (in 2009) and Montana (in 2010). Of 13 
the 1,483 survey returns, 551 were from residents who indicated that they had been 14 
threatened by a wildfire. The actions taken by these residents in response to the threats and 15 
the percentage taking these actions are shown in Figure 1. 16 
---------------------------------------- 17 
Figure 1 about here 18 
---------------------------------------- 19 
Of the 551 residents who had been threatened, 33% decided to stay on their property while 20 
55% decided to leave—but more than half of these evacuating residents (33% of the total) 21 
chose to delay their evacuation. 22 
Research suggests that wildfire evacuation practices in a given location are likely to 23 
have an appreciable effect on residents’ compliance [22]. The researchers investigated 24 
residents’ intended evacuation behavior if facing a wildfire threat. Postal survey data were 25 
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obtained from 1018 East Mountain, Arizona, residents. They were asked if they would 1 
evacuate under both voluntary and mandatory evacuation orders. The “yes” response for a 2 
voluntary evacuation order was 57 percent, while that for a mandatory evacuation order was 3 
89 percent. The finding suggests that more residents are likely to delay evacuation under a 4 
voluntary evacuation warning than under a mandatory evacuation order. While most residents 5 
under mandatory evacuation orders will only have to decide how and when they will leave, 6 
many residents under voluntary warning conditions will have to decide first whether or not to 7 
leave, and if the decision is affirmative when and how they will leave. Probit analyses 8 
showed that a major determinant of residents’ reported willingness to evacuate was their level 9 
of concern about the likely threat to their home posed by a wildfire. Women reported greater 10 
willingness to evacuate, and possession of animals reduced reported willingness to evacuate. 11 
 Paveglio et al. [41] analyzed responses to 1155 survey returns (a 61% completion 12 
rate) from Flathead County in northwest Montana. Residents were asked to indicate their 13 
level of agreement or disagreement with each of nine statements about their likely intentions 14 
if a wildfire threatened their property. Most (71%) respondents intended to remain and 15 
protect their property against small (spot) fires. The same percentage indicated that they 16 
intended to ‘wait and see’ how the wildfire threat unfolded before making a final decision. 17 
However, most (78%) agreed that they would evacuate when authorities told them to do so. 18 
 Apart from the study by Mozumder et al. [22] no research about demographic 19 
indicators and wildfire evacuation or delayed evacuation could be located. Clearly more 20 
research in relation to this topic is required. For other natural disasters (mostly involving 21 
hurricanes and floods) a recent systematic review of research on evacuations in the United 22 
States and other countries [42] reported that the following demographic indicators were 23 
associated with lower likelihood of evacuation: (a) male gender, (b) older age (65+ years), 24 
(c) non-Caucasian ethnicity, (d) households with no children, and (e) households with pets. It 25 
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is highly likely that these factors are relevant to wildfire evacuation, and they may also be 1 
associated with delayed evacuation. 2 
3.2. Canadian research 3 
Beverly and Bothwell [16] compiled descriptive data on wildfire evacuations in Canada over 4 
the period 1980-2007. They reported that during the 27 year period there were 547 5 
evacuation events involving 209,121 people. Ninety percent of those who evacuated did so in 6 
response to a general evacuation order by authorities, less than three percent made self-7 
initiated evacuation decisions. However, these figures were based largely on newspaper 8 
accounts rather than agency data and their accuracy may be questionable. Over the 27 year 9 
period a total of 497 homes were destroyed and a single civilian death occurred (in 1989). 10 
The authors concluded that “With frequencies of wildfire-related home losses and civilian 11 
fatalities that contrast sharply with those in Australia and the United States, Canada 12 
represents a truly remarkable success story when it comes to protecting people and property 13 
from wildfire” (p. 593). While no studies were located which provided information about 14 
delayed evacuation or refusals to evacuate, Beverly and Bothwell’s findings suggest that, 15 
overall, levels of residents’ normative beliefs that evacuating promptly on receipt of a 16 
warning is what one should do are likely to be high in most at-risk regions in Canada. The 17 
Horse River Wildfire of May 2016 resulted in mandatory evacuation orders for several 18 
locations in the Fort McMurray, Alberta, region. Some 88,000 residents were evacuated. 19 
There were two fatalities associated with a vehicle accident. An investigative report into the 20 
fire for the Alberta Department of Agriculture and Forestry identified some shortcomings in 21 
aspects of the initial management of the fire [43], and evacuations were apparently hampered 22 
by breakdown of cell phone communications. Further empirical research is desirable to 23 
explore delayed evacuation and refusal to evacuate in Canada. 24 
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Cote and McGee [44] surveyed 12 focus group participants who were residents of 1 
Mount Lorne in Yukon Territory, Canada. In response to a question about what they would 2 
prefer to do in the event of a wildfire threat, all indicated that they would prefer to stay and 3 
defend their property. During discussion the perceived safety of properties was an important 4 
influence on evacuation intentions, as were the possibilities of produce, livestock and pet 5 
losses. As one participant explained, “You would hate to leave, or be told to leave, and then 6 
come back and see everything burnt down because an ember landed on your lawn chair” (p. 7 
500). Eight participants agreed that if the fire threat seemed to be severe they would probably 8 
leave. However, participants indicated uncertainty about their ability to identify an extreme 9 
fire threat in order to leave in a safe, timely, manner. 10 
3.3. Australian research 11 
3.3.1 Post-wildfire Research  Tibbits and Whittaker [45] analyzed data from nine focus 12 
groups involving 73 participants from communities affected by bushfires in north-eastern 13 
Victoria in 2003. The aim was to ascertain residents’ levels of understanding and support for 14 
the then prepare, stay and defend or leave early policy described in Section 2 and if they had 15 
implemented the policy during the fires. They found high levels of awareness of, and strong 16 
support for, the policy. The majority of residents opposed forced evacuations. The 17 
practicalities of preparing, staying and defending were well understood. However, there was 18 
confusion about self-evacuating ‘early’: for some it meant the day before a predicted severe 19 
fire weather threat, for others it was following a warning from authorities, and for some it 20 
was after a trigger-event such as seeing smoke, flames or embers. Tibbits and Whittaker 21 
found that influential factors in participants’ decisions to stay and defend or to evacuate 22 
included: the number of people available to stay and defend, responsibility for vulnerable 23 
household members, level of financial and emotional investment in the property, and 24 
responsibility for livestock and pets. They noted that “….many of those who plan to stay and 25 
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defend their properties are not fully committed to doing so. Many of those who plan to stay 1 
and defend are consciously or unconsciously retaining late evacuation as a last-minute 2 
option…” (p. 289).  3 
Proudley [46] interviewed 38 couples affected by a bushfire in South Australia’s lower 4 
Eyre Peninsula in 2006 which caused nine fatalities, focusing on their uncertainty about 5 
staying in their home or evacuating to a safer location. Proudley found that it was difficult for 6 
households to decide whether to remain in their house for protection or to risk driving to 7 
presumed safety, chiefly because of differences between husbands and wives about what to 8 
do and concerns by mothers about their children’s safety. 9 
Immediately following the disastrous Victorian 2009 bushfires the AFAC requested the 10 
Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (BCRC) undertake a program of field interviews with 11 
surviving householders in eight of the worst affected areas. The BCRC and its successor 12 
organization the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre (BNHCRC) 13 
subsequently conducted additional post-bushfire field interviews on behalf of state fire 14 
agencies in Western Australia in 2011 and 2014, in New South Wales and Tasmania in 2013 15 
and in South Australia in 2014. In these studies researchers visited properties which had been 16 
threatened and interviewed residents about their pre-bushfire risk perceptions, plans and 17 
preparations, warnings received on the day of the fire, and decisions made and actions taken 18 
on the day. The eight studies involved 23 bushfire events. A total of 1,641 interviews were 19 
conducted with residents who had been threatened (this total excludes residents interviewed 20 
who had not been on their property at the time of the fire). More information about the 21 
studies is available in [47 - 49]. The actions taken by these residents are summarized in 22 
Figure 2. Across all eight studies, the unweighted average percentage of residents who 23 
evacuated was 60 percent, and appreciable percentages of these (unweighted mean 21%, 24 
range 15% - 64%) delayed their evacuation. Residents of rural (farming and other 25 
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agribusinesses) properties were more likely to stay and defend them, residents of WUI 1 
properties were more likely to leave. The reported reasons for choice were reasonably 2 
consistent. Most residents who chose to stay and defend their property did so because they 3 
wanted to protect valued assets. They believed that they would be successful, with most 4 
accepting some degree of risk, and they feared that the assets would be destroyed in their 5 
absence. A small number chose to stay because their only evacuation route would have taken 6 
them through forested areas which they believed would expose them to greater danger than if 7 
they remained.  8 
------------------------------------ 9 
Figure 2 about here 10 
------------------------------------- 11 
Residents who evacuated reported that their reason for leaving was that failing to do so 12 
would expose them and other household members to the possibility of death or injury. The 13 
two major determinants of residents’ actions (stay, leave) were (a) their pre-fire plan or 14 
intention—this was especially so for those who evacuated, and (b) the perceived severity of 15 
the fire threat. Many of those who initially planned to stay and defend their property changed 16 
their mind and evacuated when they perceived the fire to be more intense than they had 17 
expected (unweighted average = 20%, range = 11% to 28%). 18 
 In addition to the field interviews discussed above, the BCRC also commissioned 19 
postal surveys of 6,000 households impacted or threatened by fires in those areas (with an 20 
additional postal survey following the 2015 Sampson Flat fire in South Australia) [50]. A 21 
total of 1314 completed surveys were returned, a 25 percent response rate. Fifty three percent 22 
of respondents stayed to defend their properties, four percent sheltered passively, and 43 23 
percent left—while a small number escaped a threatened township in a police-escorted 24 
convoy, most self-evacuated. The authors noted that:  25 
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“Just over half of these respondents (54%) considered themselves to have left late or 1 
very late, with 16% leaving within 20 min of the fire arriving and one quarter (25%) 2 
leaving once the fire had arrived. Most (80%) perceived the level of danger to be high 3 
or very high when they left. With many experiencing difficulties associated with 4 
smoke (55%), poor visibility (35%), traffic (30%), embers (29%), flames (26%) and 5 
fallen trees (16%)”. [50, p. 845] 6 
 An unexpected finding from studies following two of the bushfire events listed in 7 
Figure 2 was that some residents who were not at home when the bushfire evacuation 8 
warnings were issued attempted to return to their property before arrival of the fire front, and 9 
most did so successfully. Following the October 2013 fires in New South Wales 589 10 
residents of affected areas responded to social media invitations to complete an online survey 11 
asking about their experiences [51]. Two hundred and twenty nine (58%) of the respondents 12 
were not at home when the evacuation warning was broadcast and 185 (64%) of these 13 
attempted to return to their properties before the arrival of the fire front, 147 of whom (80%) 14 
were successful. Following the January 2014 Perth Hills Western Australia fire, of the 91 15 
residents interviewed, 87 were in the local area when the evacuation warning was broadcast; 16 
25 of these (29%) were not at their property and 21 of them (84%) attempted to return. Three 17 
were prevented by police road blocks, but 18 returned to their property before the arrival of 18 
the fire front—4 stayed and defended their homes successfully while 14 left subsequently and 19 
drove to safer locations [52]. In both studies the reasons given for attempting to return 20 
included: to defend the property, to make final preparations for house protection, to take care 21 
of livestock or collect pets, and to collect valuables so as to keep them safe. 22 
Detailed analyses of interviews with survivors of the 2009 Victorian bushfires showed 23 
that many of those who evacuated late did so because of uncertainty about (a) whether they 24 
were under imminent threat and (b) safe destinations and evacuation routes [53]. The 25 
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uncertainty resulted from failures by authorities to provide timely and location-specific 1 
warnings, compounded by widespread loss of electrical power, and destruction of telephone 2 
lines and mobile phone transmission towers [32]. Many of those interviewed, together with 3 
those who responded to a post-fire mail survey [50], reported that the extreme heat on 7 4 
February 2009 had caused them to be resting inside darkened, air conditioned homes thus 5 
reducing their receptiveness to warnings and their awareness of environmental cues such as 6 
smoke and embers. 7 
Inspection of the reports prepared following the post-bushfire interview studies [53 - 8 
59] revealed that most of those residents who delayed their evacuation did so because they 9 
believed that they were unlikely to ever be threatened by a bushfire and were thus not 10 
prepared, psychologically and logistically, to evacuate when threatened. A smaller number 11 
had planned to wait if warned about a bushfire threat in order to see if their property was 12 
likely to be seriously threatened before making a final decision to leave or remain. Figure 3 13 
summarizes the findings.  14 
 The unweighted average percentage of those who, before the fire, did not believe they 15 
were at risk of a bushfire threat was 18 percent. The unweighted average percentage of those 16 
who intended to wait and see how events developed in the event of a bushfire threat was 17 17 
percent. The majority of those who intended to wait in order to see if evacuation was 18 
necessary did so, two thirds ultimately left, one-third remained on their property. The 19 
findings suggest that residents’ level of pre-fire risk perception is an important determinant of 20 
delayed evacuation—consistent with the findings reported in the US study by Mozumder et 21 
al. [22]. 22 
--------------------------------------------- 23 
Figure 3 about here 24 
---------------------------------------------- 25 
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Accounts by residents in several of the reports indicated that for many, evacuation was 1 
delayed by lack of preparation, a factor noted by Wilkinson et al. [51]: “Even those who had 2 
planned on leaving early did not adequately prepare to do so. Many had not considered what 3 
they would pack or what they would do if they were not at home at the time of the fire to grab 4 
packed belongings” (p. 533). There was also evidence from the reports summarized in Figure 5 
3 that impaired decision making due to high levels of anxiety and fear once the imminent fire 6 
danger was apparent contributed to delayed evacuation for some residents by slowing 7 
decision processes [53 - 55]. 8 
3.3.2 Delayed Evacuation  McLennan Elliott and Beatson [60] analyzed 584 returns from a 9 
survey of residents in notably wildfire-prone locations in south-eastern Australia. Residents 10 
were presented with a hypothetical bushfire threat scenario and asked what action they would 11 
take. The responses were: 47 percent chose the ‘leave as soon as possible’ option, 24 percent 12 
chose the ‘stay and defend the property’ option, and 29 percent chose the ‘wait and see how 13 
events develop’ option. On the basis of negative-binomial regression analyses the major 14 
determinants of residents’ reported strength of intention to stay and defend were levels of: 15 
(a) belief that staying and defending was the appropriate action to take, (b) sense of self-16 
determination, (c) awareness of possible danger associated with staying and defending, and 17 
(d) belief that one is capable of defending successfully. The major determinants of strength of 18 
intention to leave were levels of: (a) belief that leaving was the correct action to take, 19 
(b) normative belief that others regard leaving as the appropriate action to take, (c) belief that 20 
one is capable of leaving safely, and (d) belief that leaving would be a safe course of action to 21 
take. Those who chose the ‘wait and see’ option were asked to describe their reasons for 22 
choosing this, rejecting the ‘leave as soon as possible’ option, and rejecting the ‘stay and 23 
defend’ option. Their responses were examined for content and categorized by two judges 24 
jointly. The results are summarized in Tables 1-3, respectively. 25 
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------------------------------------------ 1 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here 2 
------------------------------------------- 3 
The reasons given by the residents for their choice to wait and see how the (hypothetical) 4 
bushfire threat developed rather than choosing either the ‘leave as soon as possible’ option or 5 
the ‘stay and defend’ option varied [61]. However, some themes were evident—particularly 6 
when considered in combination with the reasons given for rejecting the ‘leave’ and the ‘stay’ 7 
options. Many of those intending to wait and see did not perceive their property to be notably 8 
at risk of being threatened seriously by a bushfire. They also believed that if a threat occurred 9 
the danger would not be great, and delaying a decision was not viewed as adding to risk. For 10 
some there were potential dangers and costs associated with evacuating: this option was not 11 
seen as resulting necessarily in a positive outcome. However, the possibility of death or 12 
injury if trapped on the property by an intense fire was appreciated and feared. For many, it 13 
seems likely that evacuating unnecessarily or staying on the property and having to survive a 14 
serious bushfire attack were equally unattractive alternatives, leading to a mindset of waiting 15 
and hoping that an actual threat did not eventuate. This explanation of why some at-risk 16 
residents plan to wait and see how a wildfire threat develops before deciding whether or not 17 
to evacuate following a warning is consistent with findings reported by McNeill et al. [62]. In 18 
a longitudinal study, the researchers analyzed 189 responses from Western Australian 19 
residents of at-risk locations near to the capital city, Perth. They conceptualized residents’ 20 
delaying planning to definitely leave or remain on their property to defend it as a decision 21 
avoidance problem. Multinomial logistical regression analyses were used to determine that 22 
choice of a ‘delay’ option resulted from a perceived lack of difference between leaving and 23 
staying in outcome desirability: 24 
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“…it appears that that residents who are aware that they are living in an area at risk of 1 
wildfire and know that they should be planning their response to a wildfire threat feel 2 
stuck between two competing responses that serve competing highly valued outcomes 3 
(e.g. they do not want to lose their property or livestock, but they also want to keep 4 
themselves and their loved ones safe)” [62, p. 159]. 5 
It seems likely that a low level of perceived wildfire risk can play a role in residents delaying 6 
leaving following an evacuation warning. A review by McLennan et al. [63] suggests that 7 
residents’ perceived levels of wildfire risk are likely to be low if (a) fire authorities do not 8 
regard the area as being at notably high risk of wildfire, and (b) the area has not experienced 9 
a significant bushfire threat for ten years or more. However, factors other than risk perception 10 
may also contribute—especially the anticipated possible adverse consequences of making 11 
what might turn out to be a ‘wrong’ decision to leave, or to stay.  12 
3.3.3 Demographic Factors  Research into demographic factors associated with evacuation 13 
has focused on gender. An analysis of circumstances associated with 552 civilian bushfire 14 
fatalities over the period 1900 – 2008 showed that men were more likely to die in the course 15 
of defending a property while women and children were more likely to perish while fleeing 16 
or while sheltering passively [64]. It has been well established that women are more likely 17 
than men to evacuate if threatened [65 - 67].   18 
3.4. Summary 19 
While research on North American residents’ actions under imminent wildfire threat is 20 
somewhat limited, six tentative general conclusions are suggested. (1) Regardless of whether 21 
an evacuation warning is mandatory or advisory, it should not be assumed that all residents of 22 
a threatened location will evacuate promptly following an evacuation warning or order: it is 23 
highly likely that some, perhaps a large percentage, will want to remain to protect their 24 
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property. A significant percentage are likely to delay leaving, with some taking action only 1 
when they perceive fire impact to be imminent because they believe the possible costs of 2 
evacuating to be high (dangers associated with evacuating, financial, inconvenience) and they 3 
want to be certain that evacuation is necessary. In addition, it is likely that some residents 4 
who are not at their properties when an evacuation warning is issued will attempt to return 5 
before the arrival of the fire front. (2) Policies and practices of the local emergency services 6 
and law enforcement agencies about evacuation are likely to influence the percentages of 7 
residents willing to evacuate. Mandatory evacuation orders are likely to result in higher 8 
evacuation rates and fewer residents delaying their evacuation, especially if residents are 9 
aware of provisions for enforcement. Community social norms that evacuation is the 10 
appropriate response to wildfire threat will enhance prompt evacuation. (3) Residents of WUI 11 
amenity dwellings may be more likely to evacuate, residents of farming and other 12 
agribusiness properties may be more likely to wish to stay and defend. The major motivator 13 
for prompt evacuation is likely to be concern about possible death or injury to self and family 14 
members. A common reason for wishing to stay and defend is the desire to protect valued 15 
assets which would otherwise be destroyed, coupled with a belief that defense efforts will be 16 
successful. (4) Residents will be more likely to take prompt evacuation action if their pre-17 
warning perceptions are that a wildfire threat is possible and that their property is vulnerable 18 
to destruction in the event of a fire. These are likely to be related to authorities’ publically 19 
stated wildfire risk assessments for the area, the region’s recent wildfire history and the 20 
perceived safety of egress roads. (5) The limited data suggest that three important 21 
determinants of a resident’s decisive action following a wildfire evacuation warning are 22 
likely to be (a) their prior plan or intention about what to do if threatened by a serious 23 
wildfire, (b) the perceived danger posed by the fire, and (c) their level of prior preparation to 24 
evacuate. (6) The nature of the evacuation warnings (modality, timing, content) may be a 25 
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crucial factor in the how residents respond to a wildfire threat. This is discussed in more 1 
detail in the next Section. 2 
4. How residents respond to warnings. 3 
4.1 Effects of wildfire evacuation warnings 4 
The research reviewed in Section 3 indicated that in many instances initial warnings from 5 
authorities led to a period of waiting prior to decision making and decisive action. For many 6 
threatened residents, the trigger for decisive action to leave was seeing smoke or flames, or 7 
calls from neighbors with reports of the fire’s proximity, even though extremely high fire 8 
danger weather had been predicted by authorities [48, 49]. For some residents, only the 9 
obvious imminent impact of the fire on the property prompted (late) evacuation. Other 10 
residents received warnings but the urgency of the perceived threat situation prompted 11 
emotionally charged, and potentially flawed, decision-making about evacuation timing, 12 
routes, and even a return to their property [39, 51, 55]. Warnings could lead to conflict and 13 
indecision within families about what to do [46] and consequent delays in leaving. Delays 14 
could also result if power failures cut access to information sources [32, 39]. Evacuation 15 
decisions could be delayed by the receipt of competing, salient unofficial information relating 16 
to places of safe refuge or possible threat to an evacuation route [68]. 17 
For many residents, receipt of a wildfire evacuation warning prompted a search for more 18 
information rather than prompt action to leave for a safer location. This was often associated 19 
with warnings being infrequent, or lacking timely or location-specific information thus 20 
leading to a psychological state of uncertainty, resulting in information search rather than 21 
decisive action to evacuate [39, 48]. While research on the effects of wildfire warnings on 22 
residents is limited, the phenomenon of residents delaying and engaging in information 23 
search following warnings rather than taking protective actions has been discussed 24 
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extensively in relation to threats from other hazards such as hurricanes, tornadoes, floods and 1 
chemical and radiation contamination [69 - 71]. Several models of the hazard warning and 2 
action process conceptualize information seeking responses during the pre-impact phase as a 3 
sense-making endeavor which may result in delayed decision making and action [72 - 75]. 4 
Overall, these models suggest a general sequence of behavioral process stages when a 5 
disaster event threatens residents: 6 
1. Receiving an alert. 7 
2. Believing the source is credible and confirming the threat event. 8 
3. Personalizing the threat. 9 
4. Evaluating whether protective action is needed and feasible—often following 10 
information search. 11 
5. Deciding what action to take. 12 
The research described in Section 3 suggests that evacuation decision making can be delayed 13 
at any or all of the Belief, Personalizing and Evaluating stages. If the warning messages do 14 
not contain enough specific information, further information seeking is likely to be 15 
undertaken. For example, Trigg et al. [48] reported that the most common reactions to initial 16 
warnings by the residents interviewed following the South Australian bushfires of 2014 were 17 
to turn on the radio for information (39%), phone others close by (34%) or look up the fire 18 
agency website (33%), rather than taking protective action immediately. The importance of a 19 
sense making loop has been proposed by Ryan [76] to understand possible sources of delay, 20 
whereby a notionally threatened resident may engage in a cyclical process of seeking and 21 
obtaining information from a source or collection of sources, followed by renewed 22 
information seeking in the light of what was found during a preceding information cycle—23 
including a return to sources already consulted. Thus, residents under imminent wildfire 24 
threat may choose to delay evacuating despite high levels of concern about possible danger. 25 
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 This process is represented in Figure 4, where key features of the Mileti et al. [73-75] 1 
and Savolianen [63] models were integrated with research on Australian bushfire (wildfire) 2 
warnings by Ryan [76] to show in an information seeking model the steps a resident typically 3 
goes through when under threat. The diagram shows the range of factors and the complexity 4 
of collecting information on which decisions can be made, adding to the length of time it 5 
takes to make a decision. Lindell and Perry [71] provided detailed insights into the cognitive 6 
activity that informs decision-making occurring during this threat response process. Their 7 
Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) describes the three sets of perceptions that inform 8 
this cognitive activity – threat, protective action and stakeholder perceptions.  These form the 9 
basis for the decision-making about the threat, whether it is imminent or developing over a 10 
longer term. The information seeking in the disaster model proposed by Ryan [76] expands 11 
the information search component of the PADM model and has been used here to illustrate 12 
the potentially time-consuming nature of the physical information seeking process following 13 
indications of a possible threat. Thus, residents under imminent wildfire threat may delay 14 
evacuation based on (a) perceptions formed prior to any threat indication, (b) the amount and 15 
type of information they receive just before and during the threat, and (c) perceptions they 16 
hold once they have processed this information, despite possibly high levels of concern about 17 
potential danger. 18 
4.2 Effective wildfire evacuation warnings 19 
Effective warnings and disaster messages require sufficiently detailed information that is 20 
perceived by residents to be relevant to their situation, especially the location of the threat 21 
and instructions about what action to take. Frequent repetition of the warning is also 22 
important for the threat to be perceived as real and persisting [77] so that residents begin the 23 
decision and action process as soon as possible rather than engaging in unnecessary 24 
information searching [78]. Provision of details such as evacuation routes and safe locations 25 
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[75, 79], and the nature, location, time and source of the hazard [78, 80, 81] are all likely to 1 
increase the likelihood of timely evacuation [82, 83]. Incorporating visual aids such as up-to-2 
date maps in television broadcasts, on websites, or on social media apps can motivate 3 
constructive action [54, 84, 85]. Such detailed information is likely to deter people from 4 
filling a void with rumors from unofficial sources [78, 80]. Overall, threatened residents are 5 
more likely to take action if messages contain specific details about what is happening and 6 
what actions authorities want residents to take, are communicated over multiple channels 7 
relevant to the local community, are sent out with high frequency from trusted official 8 
sources, and are confirmed by multiple channels [74].  9 
4.3 Location warning history 10 
Another factor that could contribute to delayed evacuation is the history of wildfire warnings 11 
in the particular location. A “warning fatigue” effect has been identified by some researchers 12 
[86 - 88]. This effect may result if residents have been subjected to a past series of warnings 13 
with no subsequent threat, become desensitized to such messages, and pay no attention to a 14 
current threat warning. Concern about costs associated with unnecessary wildfire evacuations 15 
may also reduce the strength of intentions of at-risk residents to evacuate on receipt of a 16 
wildfire threat warning [38, 57]. Whittaker and Handmer [89] found that residents of 17 
Victorian (Australia) communities that had been warned to evacuate on the basis of predicted 18 
extreme fire danger weather but experienced no actual bushfire threat were less likely to take 19 
precautionary action following subsequent similar predicted extreme weather warnings. 20 
While the research is limited it seems likely that residents’ actions when warned that 21 
evacuation may be necessary will be influenced by their history of warnings and fire events. 22 
In particular, a history of previous ‘false alarms' of wildfire evacuation warnings may lead to 23 
residents delaying evacuation action until such time as they have credible information that the 24 
danger is real. 25 
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5. Conclusions 1 
Compared with the situation for evacuation from building fires, where the published research 2 
on behavioral factors is extensive [90, 91], published research into behavioral factors 3 
involved in wildfire evacuation is more limited, particularly for North American 4 
communities. This means that conclusions about residents’ evacuation behavior based on 5 
published research must be tentative. There is a need for more comprehensive investigations 6 
of the behavioral factors involved in residents delaying leaving following a wildfire 7 
evacuation warning. Recent research suggests that influences of community-level factors on 8 
residents’ preparations for wildfire threat are likely to be important [92]. Based on the 9 
research discussed in this review some broad generalizations are suggested. 10 
5.1 Behavior under wildfire threat 11 
In the course of most wildfire events involving an evacuation warning some residents will not 12 
comply, others will delay their evacuation to the point of their safety being compromised, and 13 
some who are not on their property when the warning is issued will attempt to return. Those 14 
who do not comply will mostly be motivated by a desire to protect valued assets (including 15 
pets and livestock) which they believe may be lost in their absence. The limited available 16 
research suggests that most residents who delay evacuation do not have a pre-event plan to 17 
evacuate in the event of a wildfire warning and have thus not prepared to evacuate—either 18 
psychologically or logistically. Their situation may be made worse by the stress of the threat 19 
situation degrading the quality of decision making thus further compromising safety. For 20 
some residents, the lack of preparation will most likely result from a prior failure to 21 
contemplate and engage with the possibility that their life and their property might be 22 
jeopardized by a future wildfire. Others may have considered the likelihood of a future 23 
wildfire threat but decided that the possibility is sufficiently remote as not to be deserving of 24 
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action in comparison with more salient concerns associated with daily life [93]. Some others 1 
will have accepted the possibility of a future wildfire threat and will have judged their 2 
vulnerability to be low so that evacuation would only be necessary if there was compelling 3 
evidence that their life was in danger—they will have planned to delay evacuation in order to 4 
wait and see if it is really necessary. For some residents, evacuation will be a difficult, and 5 
thus delayed, undertaking because of their adverse life circumstances—such as age, 6 
disability, social isolation or other disadvantage [11]. 7 
 Contextual factors may affect the percentages of residents in a given location who 8 
will not comply with an evacuation warning or delay evacuation. These might include: policy 9 
as to whether evacuation is mandatory or optional and, if mandatory, enforcement practices; 10 
authorities’ wildfire risk rating of the location and its previous wildfire history; the 11 
effectiveness of authorities’ prior community wildfire safety promotion and education 12 
endeavors; the property mix of amenity residences and farming and agribusinesses; the egress 13 
road network; and the demographic makeup of the residents. 14 
 When a wildfire threatens, the nature of the warnings issued by authorities is likely to 15 
influence both compliance with an evacuation warning and timeliness of evacuations. 16 
Warnings with a long lead time before fire impact and frequent updates, and containing 17 
detailed information about the current fire situation, predicted location threats and times, and 18 
specific directions about safe evacuation destinations and routes, are likely to reduce levels of 19 
non-compliance and self-delayed evacuations. 20 
5.2 Wildfire evacuation modeling 21 
As noted in Section 1 modeling the impact of a wildfire on a community can enable 22 
emergency services authorities to better understand, plan and prepare for evacuations facing a 23 
range of likely future wildfire threats under different weather, population characteristics, 24 
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egress route capacities and vegetation fuel load conditions [37]. Prompt evacuation from a 1 
threatened location does not guarantee that fleeing residents will be safe from harm. Safe 2 
evacuation is not simply a matter of authorities convincing residents to leave, or to leave 3 
sooner. The means to allow safe egress from the threatened area must be available. An ability 4 
to model likely progression of future wildfire evacuations from a given location under 5 
different conditions is particularly important because the road and transport infrastructures in 6 
some areas may not be able to cope with a large volume of vehicles and/or pedestrians all 7 
leaving at the same time. For example, during the 2016 Fort McMurray fire the major egress 8 
route (Canada Highway 63) became jammed with traffic due to a mass evacuation, with some 9 
vehicles running out of fuel, and those evacuees being immobilized and potentially exposed 10 
to hazardous conditions as the fire advanced [94].  11 
The need to incorporate representations of behavioral aspects of evacuee performance 12 
in building egress models has been discussed by Kuligowski et al. [95]. It seems equally 13 
important for wildfire evacuation models to do likewise if they are to be useful, though not all 14 
do so [96]. The research findings discussed in this paper suggest that the complexities of 15 
modeling evacuee behavior under imminent wildfire threat may be somewhat greater than for 16 
evacuations from buildings because of the number of factors potentially influencing 17 
residents’ responses to wildfire threats-- including the range of protective action options 18 
which might be available to residents and the influence of local contextual factors noted in 19 
5.1. This implies that for models to prove useful, they should be able to incorporate detailed 20 
location-specific information about the residents’ likely actions following an evacuation 21 
warning. In turn, agencies responsible for the wildfire safety of communities would need to 22 
collect and monitor relevant psychosocial information about: (a) residents’ levels of 23 
perceived wildfire risk, wildfire safety plans, and wildfire safety preparations, in relation to 24 
(b) their key demographic characteristics such age, household compositions, special needs, 25 
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transport options and pet and livestock ownership, and also (c) the warning and threat history 1 
of the location. Such a proposal for agencies is by no means original, it was discussed by 2 
Mozumder et al. [22]. Yet it is uncertain how widespread such agency practices are currently. 3 
5.3 Possible actions by Authorities to address late wildfire evacuations 4 
There are a number of actions that can be taken by authorities to reduce the number of 5 
residents who will delay evacuating following wildfire warnings. 6 
1. Continue to improve the accuracy, comprehensiveness, timeliness, and location-specificity 7 
of wildfire warnings for residents in at-risk locations so as to reduce householder uncertainty 8 
about their threat situation and thus encourage early survival decisions and actions. Ongoing 9 
developments in social media-based communications technology are likely to contribute and 10 
new applications need to be developed and trialed.  11 
2. Increase householders’ knowledge and understanding of the risks involved in last-minute 12 
flight or last-ditch defense of an under-prepared property. 13 
3. Reduce householders’ reluctance to leave by:  14 
(a) assisting them with advice about preparations to leave which are minimally 15 
inconvenient but sufficient to survive, encouraging planning for staged moves to 16 
successively safer locations during the course of a wildfire event as their known threat 17 
level increases, and providing pre-fire information about likely safe evacuation 18 
destinations and routes;  19 
(b) emphasizing that a house can be prepared to survive wildfire attack without the 20 
resident having to be present to actively defend it. ‘The safest place to be during a wildfire 21 
is somewhere else, and here are things to do so that your house is more likely be standing 22 
when you return’;  23 
(c) concentrating on advising householders about low-cost actions they can take to reduce 24 
house vulnerability to bushfire, such as clearing vegetation and combustibles from around 25 
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the house, rather than emphasizing more costly measures such as retrofitting the house 1 
with fire-resistant construction materials; 2 
(d) emphasizing the importance of being prepared to leave before a fire is near, and 3 
providing clear and simple advice on what such preparation entails; 4 
(e) allaying concerns about looting; 5 
(f) emphasizing that while residents should be alert for wildfire warnings from authorities, 6 
they should not expect to be contacted individually and told when to leave, they should 7 
instead decide beforehand on their own ‘triggers’ for leaving safely prior to imminent 8 
threat, and actively monitor the emerging fire situation utilizing both media information 9 
and environmental cues. 10 
 By way of a concluding comment, the last point (f) seems likely to present a particular 11 
challenge for fire agencies: how best to help residents understand what, for their situation, 12 
is likely to constitute an ‘imminent’ wildfire threat necessitating immediate evacuation? 13 
This issue clearly needs further research. 14 
 15 
  16 
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